Afghan Policy: Graveyards of Apolitical Thought

 Afghan Policy: Graveyards of Apolitical Thought

After the departure of foreign rulers in 1947, the main tragedy of our country has been the failure to create such an organic and democratic relationship between the people and the state in which the people have confidence in the state to meaningfully participate in decision-making on the distribution of economic resources. will be done, and the federating units will be able to get the rights under the principles that they were promised during the demand for Pakistan. They will have access to justice according to the law. Also, the state will protect the economic interests of the citizens to improve their quality of life. In the early years, a series of events took place that dashed all these expectations.

The first twenty-five years of Pakistan were marked by two problems. Constitution-making and viable division of political power between the eastern and western parts of the country. In this conflict, state institutions seized power. The political process came to a standstill and eventually East Pakistan established a separate state after a bloody conflict. The creation of Bangladesh was not only the biggest tragedy in the history of Pakistan, it was also the worst failure of the state system established in 1947. 56% of the country's population and one-third of its area went away. Pakistan's largest export species, cotton, went out of hand. The country which simultaneously covered the two main geographical regions of South Asia and the Far East became home to different regions of South Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East. The secession of East Pakistan was the worst state crime against the people of Pakistan. Exactly seven years after this tragedy, the second worst crime against the nation was committed to bolster the interests of a new military dictatorship. has been. Pakistan's involvement in Afghan affairs was the starting point of a descent into a quagmire that has remained like a heavy stone around the neck of the nation till date.

Regardless of the continued pursuit of foreign interests in exchange for unproductive financial aid, Pakistani decision-makers ignored the fundamental differences in the constituent elements of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan was a federation of various linguistic, religious, geographical, cultural and historical units that came into existence as a result of a constitutional compromise which was trying to form a common collective identity on the basis of religious identity since its establishment. Afghanistan, on the other hand, was a state on the fringes of the post-World War II world order whose main problem was to strike a workable balance between ethnic and tribal interests. There were features of constitutional politics in Pakistan, the main mechanism of which is political dialogue. There are elements of disagreement and compromise in political dialogue. In ethnic and tribal differences, the possibility of wider economic interests and collective understanding is lost. In the late 70s

There were some differences in objectives between the Pakistani ruling and Afghan warring forces. The Pakistani leadership was concerned that it should not be embroiled in a two-sided war with the Soviet Union and Afghanistan in the west and India in the east. Although the likelihood of aggression on the western front was very low, there was the possibility of covert support from Pakhtun and Baloch nationalists. Immediately after December 1979, according to a conservative estimate, four hundred thousand Afghan refugees entered Pakistan with considerable freedom of movement. Later, at one stage, this number reached 35 lakhs. Thanks to these refugees, Pakistan also expected financial aid on humanitarian basis and with the help of these refugees, it was also facilitated in covert intervention in Afghanistan. The Afghan situation guaranteed the longevity of General Ziaul Haq's dictatorship. This is the reason that in early 1988, Prime Minister Junejo intended to sign the Geneva Agreement, but Ziaul Haq directly rejected it. Considering an attack on his personal power, on March 13, 1988, Zain Noorani, the deputy foreign minister at the time, expressed his humility in unpublishable words at the cabinet meeting. On the one hand, Zia-ul-Haq wanted to become the so-called leader of the Islamic world by continuing to intervene in Afghanistan despite the withdrawal of Soviet forces, on the other hand, he wanted to establish a government of groups under his influence in Kabul and make Afghanistan practically a part of Pakistan. should be converted into a sub-state.

Pakistani decision-makers including Zia-ul-Haq were completely unfamiliar with the tribal psychology of Afghan groups and the nature of internecine differences. After the Geneva agreement, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevnadze advised Pakistan to distance itself from Afghan affairs. After the Soviet withdrawal in February 1989, the largest covert operation of the Western countries, including the United States, during the Cold War had also achieved its goals. However, the political and social map that Pakistan was captured in the 80s and the economic interests associated with the Afghan war in Pakistan had grown to such an extent that Pakistan was considering its hidden armed strategy as its valuable asset.

Attacks on Jalalabad started in March 1989, which was completely defeated by the Najib government by May 1989. Meanwhile, after changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, Najibullah resigned in April 1992 and Afghanistan entered a new era of civil war. The Pakistan-sponsored Peshawar Agreement was not successful, nor was the Afghan Interim Government able to establish an effective arrangement. Even in September 1994, the Taliban appeared and captured Kabul in 1996.